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1. Introduction 
 
Social polarization has recently become at the focus of interest of re-
searchers from a broad range of fields. As any social concept, social polari-
zation may be defined in a number of ways but the definition given by 
Esteban and Ray [1994] is now treated as classical and will be used as basic 
in the present work: 
“Suppose that a population of individuals may be grouped according to 
some vector of characteristics into clusters, such that each cluster is very 
similar in terms of the attributes of its members, but different clusters have 
members with very dissimilar attributes. In that case, we say that the society 
is polarized”. 
Social polarization defined as above, is closely related to an antagonism 
in society and its radical manifestations. There are many studies emphasiz-
ing the inextricable link between polarization and conflicts. In his seminal 
work Horowitz [1985] states that in societies where a large ethnic majority 
is present, when a large enough ethnic minority faces the former, the most 
sever conflicts arise. Numerous empirical studies confirm the connection 
between polarization and conflicts. Particularly, it is shown that polarization 
index based on income is a significant predictor of social conflicts (see 
[Esteban et al., 2007]), ethnic polarization index is a predictor of civil wars 
(see [Montalvo, Reynal-Querol, 2005]). Moreover, not only empirical stud-
ies but also game-theoretic ones provide convincing evidence of link  
between polarization and conflict. Specifically, Esteban and Ray [2008] 
found connection between polarization index and equilibrium in a behavio- 
ral model of conflict; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol [2005] revealed connec-
tion between their polarization index and rent-seeking game. 
Therefore, the motivation to conceptualize, measure and analyze polari-
zation in society can hardly be overestimated. 
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1.1. A Review of the Literature 
 
During the last two decades a solid corpus of literature emerged dealt 
with the analysis of polarization in societies and, especially, to the ap-
proaches of social polarization measurement. The pioneering works by 
Esteban and Ray [1991, 1994] and Wolfson [1994], in fact, outlined two 
main directions in the measurement of social polarization.  
According to the first framework suggested by Esteban and Ray [1991, 
1994], polarization is considered in terms of intra-group identification and 
inter-group alienation. Esteban and Ray, themselves, call their approach 
identification-alienation framework. Within this framework it is assumed 
that an individual in society identifies herself with a particular group and 
feels alienated from other groups. The more people feel strongly connected 
with their group and distant from other groups, the more society is polar-
ized. In addition, the number and size of groups also matters. Thus, within 
the identification-alienation framework polarization rises if the groups be-
come more homogeneous internally, more separated externally, and more 
equal in size. Moreover, if the number of groups is more than one, then the 
larger the number of groups, the lower the polarization. 
Esteban and Ray take special care to the distinction between polarization 
and inequality. One of the reasons why they emphasize this issue is the en-
hanced attention that has been placed in the literature to inequality1 against 
the backdrop of much less attention paid to polarization which is, from the 
authors’ point of view, much more responsible for social tensions, conflicts 
and radical forms of their manifestation.  
In this respect, let us present one striking example which illustrates how 
inequality differs from polarization. Consider a society with two distinct 
groups of people characterized by their income; namely, the low- and high-
income population. Suppose, this year the variation of income of both low- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Even a separate field called economics of inequality was developed (see, e.g. [Foster, 
Wolfson, 1994; Esteban et al., 2007; Atkinson, 2003]). 
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and high-income people dropped comparing to the previous year, so that 
income distributions of these groups became denser. Evidentially, compar-
ing to the previous year, inequality in the society decreased; however, polar-
ization in this society raised.  
By imposing a set of reasonable axioms, Esteban and Ray [1991, 1994] 
narrowed down the class of possible polarization measures to the following 
form: 𝐸𝑅 = 𝑘 𝜋!!!!𝜋!|𝑦! − 𝑦!|!!!!
!
!!!  
for some positive constants 𝑘  and 𝛼 ∈ 0;   𝛼∗ ,     usually it is accepted 𝛼∗ ≈ 1.6. Here, 𝑦! corresponds to income level of the group 𝑖 and 𝜋! is its 
share with respect to the whole society. The parameter 𝛼 can be interpreted 
as the degree of “polarization sensitivity”. 
The strong connection between Esteban-Ray and Gini index may be re-
vealed. Specifically, when 𝛼 = 0   and 𝑘 = 1, 𝐸𝑅 index is precisely the Gini 
coefficient.  
It should be noted that 𝐸𝑅  index with a discrete metrics 𝛿 𝑦! , 𝑦! =𝑦! − 𝑦! , 𝛿 𝑦! , 𝑦! = 0  𝑖𝑓  𝑖 = 𝑗            1  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 is known as Reynal-Querol index  
 
which was presented in Reynal-Querol [2002] and actively used in ethnic 
polarization studies. 
Several other alternatives and modifications of the ER index were pro-
posed. Particularly, identification-alienation approach was actively devel-
oped, among others, by Gradin [2000], Zhang and Kanbur [2001], Duclos et 
al. [2004], Esteban et al. [2007]. 
Another governing approach to the measurement of polarization in socie-
ties was mapped out by Wolfson [1994]. In this framework polarization is 
concerned with dispersion of the income distribution from the median (or 
alternatively defined center of the distribution) towards the extreme points. 
The decline of the middle class is described, measuring how the center of 
the distribution of the specific characteristics (income, education, etc.) is 
emptied. This approach is often called as “bi-polarization”. 
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The Wolfson index of polarization can be defined as a function of the in-
equality between groups and the inequality within groups. Generalizing this 
approach, one can obtain a class of polarization measures defined as  
 𝑃 𝑥, 𝑘 = 𝑓 𝐼! 𝑥 , 𝐼! 𝑥 , 𝑆 𝑘 , 
 
where 𝑓 is a monotonic function in all arguments, 𝑥 = (𝑥!,… , 𝑥!) is a vec-
tor of a particular feature (income, political ideology, etc.) describing given 
society of size 𝑛  separated into 𝑘  groups, 𝐼! 𝑥  and 𝐼! 𝑥  are some 
measures of inequality within and between groups, respectively, and 𝑆 𝑘  is 
a measure of the 𝑘 group’s size. 
Among followers of the “bi-polarization” approach Wolfson [1997], 
Wang and Tsui [2000], Chakravarty and Majumder [2001], Rodriguez and 
Salas [2003], Chakravarty et al. [2007], Chakravarty and Ambrosio [2010], 
Gigilarano et al. [2011] can be mentioned. 
The majority of the studies devoted to the measurement of polarization in 
societies considered only the case of the one-dimensional measures. Particu-
larly, it was assumed that population in society is split into groups according 
to a single characteristic; in most cases, income level. However, societies are 
much more complex in their structure, and disagreement often arises over 
multiple issues. Thus, it is necessary to possess the techniques which allow 
to measure polarization in societies in which groups are formed according to 
multiple characteristics.  
Multidimensional polarization measures have been of growing concern 
within last years. Notwithstanding moderate success achieved in this field, 
some studies of multidimensional polarization can be found in the literature.  
Gigliarano and Mosler [2009] argue that splitting of the population can 
be based on multiple attributes such as education, wealth or health. They 
constructed a class of multidimensional polarization measures by decompos-
ing different inequality measures with measuring the relative group size. 
According to them polarization consists of inequality within groups, and 
inequality between the groups given a sufficient group size. In essence, this 
measure is a multidimensional extension of the group approach of Esteban 
and Ray [1991, 1994].  
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Sheicher [2010] extends his own unidimensional polarization measure to 
the multidimensional index which is a combination of poverty and affluence 
measures. It is based on the distance of the income of a middle class indi-
vidual to specific middle class thresholds.  
Technically, multidimensionality in polarization measures respect multi-
ple attributes via an attribute matrix in a grouping approach or have respect-
ing multiple attributes via distances to the pole thresholds. Further develop-
ments are discussed in poverty analyses [Bossert, Chakravarty, D’Ambrosio, 
2013; Nolan, Whelan, 2007; Atkinson, 2003].  
In Poole and Rosenthal [1984] an approach is proposed to estimate polar-
ization in the United States Congress. This approach is based on the use of 
well-known NOMINATE scores originally elaborated by Poole and Rosen-
thal [1983] which represent two-dimensional coordinates of the Congress-
men in the latent political space. The first dimension is interpreted as “liber-
al – conservative” dimension, while the second dimension picks up regional 
dissimilarities, attitudes on cross-cutting, salient issues of the day (e.g., slav-
ery, civil rights, lifestyle issues, etc.) (see [Poole, Rosenthal, 1997]).  
Poole and Rosenthal proposed to measure polarization as distance be-
tween the Republicans and the Democrats means of the first dimension co-
ordinate. In McCarty et al. [2006] the same approach was applied for newly 
developed joint scale DW-NOMINATE scores. The most recent results of 
estimation of polarization in the U.S. Congress are publically available on 
Voteview website.  
The major shortcoming of the approach suggested by K. Poole and  
H. Rosenthal is the fact that by averaging the coordinates of the Congress-
men we are losing the information about how scattered or dense are the clus-
ters representing the Legislators, which, evidentially, has an impact on po-
larization in the Congress. On the other hand, the present multidimensional 
index based on the central moment of forces lacks such a flaw. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The following model is an extension of the one-dimensional model pre-
sented in Aleskerov and Golubenko [2003] to the multidimensional case. 
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To the best of our knowledge, Aleskerov-Golubenko polarization index 
(AG-index) is the first attempt to adopt physical concepts to the measure-
ment of polarization in society. It was inspired by the notion of central mo-
ment of a system of forces coming from physics. The framework suggested 
by Alesrekov and Golubenko is new and alternative to two governing trends 
proposed so far; nevertheless, the measures developed within this frame-
work satisfy reasonable requirements originally specified by Esteban and 
Ray [1994].  
Suppose, we are given a society split into n groups according to particu-
lar criteria. Following the definition of social polarization by Esteban and 
Ray [1994] cited above, assume there exist attributes, or features of society 
that create similarities and differences between individuals, and, consequent-
ly, groups of individuals. Since we are considering multidimensional case, a 
vector of characteristics according to which individuals are grouped into 
clusters is multidimensional.  
Each group is described by a number 𝜈! , 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, and a vector 𝑝! =𝑝!!,… , 𝑝!" , 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, in a multidimensional space, ℝ!, where 𝑚 is a num-
ber of attributes describing the society under consideration. A number 𝜈! , 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, corresponds to the share of group’s members in the whole socie-
ty, 𝜈!!!!! = 1. For the sake of simplicity, thereafter we assume that each of 𝑚 attributes can be presented as a value of some scalar variable taking value 
from the interval [0; 1]. For instance, consider ideological “leftists – right-
ists” scale where 0 corresponds to extreme leftists and 1 – to extreme right-
ists, respectively. Thus, 𝑝!, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛 , is a point in the multidimensional 
be   0; 1 ! representing positions of the group in respective dimensions. 
Hence, each group may be seen as a weighted point in the multidimen-
sional unit cube; together all the groups form a system of weighted points.  
Let us now define a center of mass 𝑐 = 𝑐!, 𝑐!,… , 𝑐!  of the system of 
points 𝑝!, 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, in which weights 𝜈! , 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, are concentrated respec-
tively, as 
 𝑐 = 𝜈!𝑝!!!!! 𝜈!!!!! = 𝜈!𝑝!!!!!  
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Then, the multidimensional polarization index of a society under consid-
eration may be written in the following way 
 𝑃 = 𝑘 𝜈! ∙ 𝑑 𝑝!, 𝑐!!!! ,   
 
where 𝑑:ℝ!×ℝ! → ℝ is some distance function and 𝑘 is a normalizing 
coefficient. For definiteness let us present three versions of polarization in-
dex with respect to different forms of metric 𝑑. 
If 𝑑 is defined as Euclidean metric, then polarization index takes a form 
 𝑃!"# = 2𝑚 𝜈! ∙!!!! 𝑝!" − 𝑐! !!!!! . 
 
If 𝑑 is defined as Manhattan distance, then polarization index takes a 
form 𝑃!"# = 2𝑚 𝜈! ∙!!!! 𝑝!" − 𝑐!!!!! . 
 
If 𝑑 is defined as Chebychev distance, then polarization index takes a 
form 𝑃!!!" = 2 𝜈! ∙!!!! max!!!,! 𝑝!" − 𝑐! . 
 
The normalizing coefficient 𝑘 is selected in such a way that the maximal 
value of 𝑃 index was equal to 1.  
In Lipacheva [2015], inter alia, the properties of unidimensional Ales-
kerov – Golubenko polarization index have been studied. In particular, as-
ymptotical properties of the index have been examined. It has been shown 
that if 𝑛 → ∞  𝑃 → !!. However, it was proposed that polarization index 
should shrink to zero as the number of groups in society tends to infinity. 
Thus, a slight modification of this index was presented. In the multidimen-
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sional case the modified version of index can be defined in the following 
way 𝑃′ = 𝑘′𝑛 𝜈! ∙ 𝑑 𝑝!, 𝑐!!!! . 
 
Different versions of 𝑃 can be suggested according to different types of 
metrics: 𝑃!!"# = 4𝑛 𝑚 𝜈! ∙!!!! 𝑝!" − 𝑐! !!!!! , 𝑃′!"# = 4𝑛 ∙𝑚 𝜈! ∙!!!! 𝑝!" − 𝑐!!!!! ,   𝑃′!!!" = 4𝑛 𝜈! ∙!!!! max!!!,! 𝑝!" − 𝑐! .   
 
In this form, 𝑃′ index turns to zero in case of a single group and shrinks 
to very low values if the number of groups in society is very high. 
Nevertheless, it seems to us that even if the number of groups is large, 
there still might be some tension within society, and polarization does not 
shrink to zero. In addition, larger values of polarization index simplify the 
comparison of results and overall analysis. Therefore, in empirical part of 
our research we decided to use the original form of the 𝑃 index. 
 
2.1. Basic Properties of the 𝑷 Index 
 
The maximum of 𝑃 index equals 1(due to normalizing coefficient) and is 
attained in the society divided into two equally-sized groups which are posi-
tioned in two extreme points of the main diagonal of a unit cube. For in-
stance, in two-dimensional case there are four possible configurations when 
maximal value. Namely, when one of two equal groups is placed at 0, 0  
and the other at 1, 1 , or when one group’s coordinates are 0, 1 ,  while the 
other’s equal 1, 0 . However, this maximum is not unique. In what follows, 
other configuration delivering maximum will be examined. 𝑃 index takes only non-negative values since values of distance function 𝑑 ∙  and shares 𝜈! , 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛, are non-negative.  
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The minimum of 𝑃 index is equal to zero and is attained when all groups 
in the society are positioned at the same point, or when the unique group 
represents the whole society. The center of mass of the system of points co-
incides with the position of all groups in the first case and the position of the 
single group in the second case; thus, whatever form of distance function has 
been chosen, the polarization index takes zero value. 
Now, let us consider a special case of “equally” (“uniformly”) distributed 
groups.   
Suppose, a society is divided into 𝑛 equal groups which are placed in a 
unite cube in such a way that any pair of neighboring groups are equally 
distanced. In other words, these groups are placed at uniform grid points, so 
that each of their coordinates takes values !!!!!! , 𝑖 = 1, 𝑛. Evidentially, in 
such a case number of groups is equal 𝑙!, where 𝑚 is the space dimension-
ality and 𝑙 is some positive integer. 
 
Fig. 1. “Equal” distribution of n groups in two-dimensional case 
 
Even though such a distribution is fairly artificial and not likely to be ob-
served in reality, it is still interesting to be examined.  
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Since analytical study of this special distribution even for two-
dimensional case is somewhat inelegant and is associated with cumbersome 
calculations, it was analyzed numerically. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Behavior of polarization indices in the case 
of “equal” distribution of groups in two-dimensional space 
 
As Fig. 2 shows, in the case of groups equally distributed in two-
dimensional case, polarization index based on Chebychev distance is always 
not less than both indices based on Euclidean and Manhattan distances. At 
the same time, polarization index based on Manhattan distance was always 
not larger than two other indices. All these indices attain maximal value 
equal 1 when the number of groups is four (therefore, as it was mentioned 
above, maximum of the polarization index is not unique). Each version of 
polarization index converges and monotonically decreases while the number 
of groups grows. 
Analogously, Fig. 3 demonstrates a behavior of polarization indices in 
the case of “equal” distribution in three-dimensional feature space. Again, 
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polarization indices monotonically decrease when the number of group in-
creases, and all of them converge to respective values. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Behavior of polarization indices in the case  
of “equal” distribution of groups in three-dimensional space 
 
3. Empirical Applications 
 
3.1. Case of the State Duma of the Russian Federation (1994–2003) 
 
Let us now apply the methodology elaborated to an analysis of the Rus-
sian State Duma (1994–2003). 
The State Duma is a lower house of the bicameral parliament, the Federal 
Assembly, which is the national legislature body of the Russian Federation. 
The upper house is called the Federation Council.  
The State Duma had a thorny destiny and tangled history. The first elect-
ed parliament was introduced in 1906 during the reign of Tsar Nicholas II. 
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However, the first two Dumas were extremely ineffective and were quickly 
dissolved. Subsequent convocations of the State Duma were more viable 
than the first attempts; however, Russian parliament was one of the factors 
that contributed to the eradication of autocracy in the Russian Empire. Final-
ly, in 1917, after the February Revolution the State Duma was abolished. 
Later on, from 1938 until 1993 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR 
was the supreme government body performing legislative functions. This 
parliament was forcibly dissolved by President Yeltsin. According to the 
new Constitution introduced by President Yeltsin after constitutional crisis 
of 1993, the State Duma became the new generally elected legislative insti-
tution of the Russian Federation. According to the new Constitution, the 
State Duma of the Russian Federation is elected for a term of four years, and 
the procedure of the elections of deputies is determined by federal laws. The 
Russian State Duma was reelected 6 times: in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 
and 2011.  
The State Duma consists of 450 deputies. Until the fall 2005, elections 
were held under a mixed system. 225 of deputies were elected in nationwide 
electoral districts proportionally to the number of votes cast for the federal 
lists of candidates nominated by electoral parties, the remaining 225 depu-
ties were elected in single-mandate electoral districts. Since July, 2005 all of 
450 deputies are elected under a proportional system. In 1993–2003 elec-
toral threshold was set at 5% level, but since the parliamentary elections of 
2007 this threshold is equal to 7%. 
The deputies have a constitutional right to form so called deputy unions: 
factions and deputy groups. Each deputy can be a member only of a single 
deputy union. Factions are organized according to the party membership 
(only parties elected in nationwide federal district have a right to from fac-
tions); deputies not being members of factions can form deputy groups ac-
cording to their preferences. The minimal number required to from a deputy 
group was equal to 35 deputies until 2004; afterwards this number accounted 
for 55 deputies. 
In the State Duma federal laws are adopted by simple majority rule (i.e., 
226 votes are needed to pass a federal law) while constitutional laws are 
adopted by qualified majority rule (namely, 2/3 out of 450 votes, i.e., 300 
votes are needed to adopt such laws). 
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In this paper we consider three first convocations of the State Duma 
which took place during 1994–2003. The publically available roll-call votes 
of deputies provided by INDEM-Statistics enabled Aleskerov et al. [2007] to 
apply an algorithm originally suggested in Poole and Rosenthal [1983] and 
thoroughly described in Satarov [1993] in order to build spatial models, or 
so called political maps reflecting political positions of deputies of the Rus-
sian State Duma. On the whole, the problem of political maps building boils 
down to three main sub-problems: finding principal components (latent fac-
tors of political disengagement), estimation of so called factor loadings and 
calculation of corresponding values of factor variables for deputies-objects. 
A procedure suggested in Satarov [1993] and described in detail in Blago-
veshchensky [2004] consistently solves this problem. Firstly, latent factors 
of political disengagement are determined by means of multidimensional 
non-metric scaling; points obtained are centered and oriented along principal 
components. Then, for every vote the parameters are calculated determining 
to which extent the split in positions during the voting is caused by the con-
tribution of each factor. Finally, “benchmark” votes are defined according to 
the factors determined, and taking into account these parameters coordinates 
of all deputies are calculated – kind of ratings of compliance with “bench-
mark” votes on each of the factors of political disengagement. Thus, this 
three-step procedure enables to build a political map of the parliament in 
which every deputy is represented as a single point in a multidimensional 
space.2  
It turned out that positions of deputies in the Russian parliament in 1994–
2003 could be presented in a two-dimensional space. According to the inter-
pretation given in Aleskerov et al. [2007], the informative meaning of the 
latent factors determined be means of the aforementioned algorithm are 
“Loyalty – Opposition” to the current executive authorities, on the one hand, 
and “Ideology – Pragmatism” (during the 1st convocation) and “Liberals – 
Statesmen” (during the 2nd and the 3rd convocations), on the other hand. 
Originally, in our model we consider positions of groups rather than in-
dividuals, so we need to specify the coordinates of groups of deputies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Usually, linear transformations are applied to the points representing deputies, so that 
their coordinates lie in the multidimensional unit cube. 
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We will assume that coordinates of a particular group are defined by the 
average coordinates of all the deputies belonging to this group as it was done 
in Aleskerov et al. [2007].  
 
The State Duma of the 1st convocation (1994–1995) 
Elections of the deputies of the State Duma of the 1st convocation were 
held under a mixed electoral system. 225 deputies were elected in nationwide 
federal district and 219 deputies – in single mandate districts. Elections were 
not fulfilled in 5 electoral districts and were not held in Chechen Republic at 
all. 4 parties managed to cross the electoral threshold of 5%: “Liberal Demo-
cratic Party of Russia” (an unexpected favorite in the federal district), “Demo-
cratic Party of Russia”, “Women of Russia”, and “Party of Russian Unity and 
Accord”. “Russia’s Choice” won fewer votes in the federal district than ex-
pected and managed to form the largest deputy union in the State Duma of the 
1st convocation only due to the deputies elected in single-mandate districts. 
Deputy unions formed immediately after elections have been changing during 
the term of the 1st convocation. We will consider the following 11 deputy  
unions present in the State Duma of the 1st convocation. 
– “Agrarian Party of Russia” (APR)  
– ‘Russia’s Choice” (RC)  
– “Democratic Party of Russia” (DPR)  
– “Women of Russia” (WR)  
– “Communist Party of the Russian Federation” (CPRF)  
– “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia” (LDPR)  
– “New Regional Politics” (Duma-96)  
– “Party of Russian Unity and Accord” (PRES)  
– “Liberal Democratic Union of 12 December” (LDU) --  
– “Russia” (RUS) 
– “Stability” (STAB)  
– “Yabloko” (YAB) 
There were deputies who were not affiliated to any deputy union. For 
these independent deputies, in Aleskerov et al. (2007) additional classifica-
tion was given. 
– Independent LDU – the deputies who were members of the deputy 
group LDU 
	  
	  
18	  
– Independent “Democracy” – the deputies who were not affiliated to 
deputy unions and who later on belonged to the deputy group “De-
mocracy” close to CPRF 
– Independent “Outcasts” – well-known deputies who had specific repu-
tation  
– Independent – all other deputies who were not affiliated to any formal 
or informal groups of deputies 
In Aleskerov et al. [2007] spatial model of the State Duma of the 1st con-
vocation was built through exploitation of roll-call votes data and three-step 
algorithm described above. Fig. 4 shows political map of the State Duma in 
1994. 
 
Fig. 4. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1994 
 
Since the number of independent deputies not affiliated to any formal or in-
formal group was quite large, we suggest an additional technique which enables 
to attach these deputies to a particular deputy union according to “nearest 
neighborhood” rule. Specifically, for each independent deputy we consider 
some vicinity (of a particular radius) and three nearest neighbors in this vicinity. 
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We attach an independent deputy to the deputy union to which two out of three 
nearest neighbors belong. If there is no such a union, the deputy is treated to be 
independent. Such an approach is based on the idea that the position of the inde-
pendent deputy is represented by his coordinates in the spatial model of the par-
liament. Thus, independent deputies who are close to the position of their col-
leagues belonging to a particular faction or deputy group, reveal voting patterns 
similar to this union; therefore, they most probably hold the opinions similar to 
the opinions of this deputy union.  
The independent deputies who were not attached to any formal or informal 
group are treated as a separate united cluster (Fig. 5). Fig. 6 – 7 represent the 
positions of the deputy unions and groups of independent deputies in the State 
Duma in 1994.3 The size of the marker corresponds to the deputy union’s 
weight (the share of the seats the deputy union possesses in the parliament). 
 
 
Fig. 5. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1994. Independent deputies are 
attached to the deputy union according to the “nearest neighborhood” rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The cases when the “nearest neighborhood” rule was applied and was not were consid-
ered separately. 
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Fig. 6. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1994 
 
One of the specific features of the State Duma in 1994 was lack of rigid 
discipline within deputy factions and groups. Fig. 4 clearly demonstrates this 
specific feature: clusters representing deputy unions are on average rather 
sparse than dense. However, particular deputy unions can be characterized 
by stronger discipline than others, and their clusters are denser on the politi-
cal map. Specifically, all deputy factions, namely, CPRF, LDPR, WR, RC 
reveal quite high solidarity in their members’ positions. At the same time, 
deputy groups are represented by much more disperse clusters. Only depu-
ties belonging to the union “Yabloko” have quite common positions on the 
political map.  
Cross-factional migrations of deputies were not uncommon in the State 
Duma in 1994. Uncertainty of the positions of deputy unions left to deputies 
the room for maneuvers. In general, configuration of deputy unions in the 
State Duma reflects the current moods at that time: pluralism appeared in the 
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Russian politics. As Fig. 6–7 demonstrate, there were several quite numer-
ous deputy unions having different positions (deputy unions are scattered 
over almost the whole unit square), and none of these unions had over-
whelming advantages.  
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1994.  
Independent deputies are attached to the deputy union according  
to the “nearest neighborhood” rule 
 
Now, when both shares and coordinates of the deputies’ unions are de-
termined, we are able to calculate 𝑃 indices.  
 
The results obtained are presented below. 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.6746, 0.5523); 𝑃!"# = 0.3479,𝑃!"# = 0.3136,𝑃!!!" = 0.4487. 
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Now, let us calculate 𝑃 index in case when independent deputies are at-
tached to the deputy unions according to the “nearest neighborhood” rule. 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.6746, 0.5523);  𝑃!"# = 0.3571,𝑃!"# = 0.3212,𝑃!!!" = 0.4607. 
 
As we see, the center of mass, evidently, did not change. At the same 
time, the value of 𝑃 index (under different forms of metrics) almost did not 
change.  
The coordinates of the center of mass show that on average, deputy un-
ions had quite moderate positions along “Ideology – Pragmatism” dimen-
sion. However, it can be concluded that the State Duma on the whole was 
more opposed than loyal to the current executive authorities. Several events 
which have taken place at that time support this conclusion. Firstly, I. Ryb-
kin, the member of the opposition “Agrarian Party of Russia”, was elected 
as a Chairman of the State Duma. Furthermore, the State Duma voted for the 
Amnesty for participants of the events of 1991 and 1993; subsequently, op-
ponents of President Yeltsin were released.  
Values of polarization indices are moderate. The positions of deputy un-
ions were not close enough which made the parliament quite polarized; nev-
ertheless, were they sparse enough to make the parliament quite balanced.  
Now, let us present the analogous findings for the case of the State Duma 
in 1995. 
The values of polarization index: 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.7668, 0.7231);  𝑃!"# = 0.2190,𝑃!"# = 0.1876,𝑃!!!" = 0.2919 
 
Application of the “nearest neighborhood” approach to treatment of in-
dependent deputies almost did not change the view of political map. Thus, 
we do not provide the figures of political map and positions of the factions. 
However, we do provide the values of 𝑃 index which slightly increased: 𝑃!"# = 0.2227,𝑃!"# = 0.1909,𝑃!!!" = 0.22968. 
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Fig. 8. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1995 
 
Both points configuration on the political map and values of polarization 
indices clearly show that deputies were much more unanimous in their polit-
ical positions in 1995 than a year before. Fig. 8–9 clearly indicate the drift of 
all deputy unions to the upper right area of the political map – actually, al-
most all points are concentrated in this quadrant of the unit square. Conse-
quently, the center of mass has significantly shifted upwards and to the right 
comparing to the previous year (compare (0.6746, 0.5523) in 1994 and (0.7668, 0.7231) in 1995). Deputies became more opposed to the current 
executive authorities (first of all, represented by the President) and revealed 
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more pragmatism while voting. At the same time, relatively high unanimity 
in deputies’ positions on the political map is explicitly reflected in dropped 
values of polarization indices: they decreased about 1.5 times (within both 
groups-points and deputies-points approaches and for different distance 
functions) comparing to the case of 1994.  
 
Fig. 9. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1995 
 
The results obtained exhibit a good agreement with political realities and, 
particularly, moods in the State Duma in 1995. One of the crucial events 
which gave strong impetus to changes of the political positions of deputies 
and contributed to the increased opposition of the State Duma on the whole 
was the launch of military operations in Chechnya. In addition, deputies ex-
hibited quite cohesive position (again, opposed to the current authorities) 
	  
	  
25	  
while voting on the issue of confidence in the Government. In June, 1995, in 
connection with hospital hostage crisis in Budyonnovsk, the State Duma 
expressed non-confidence in the Government. A vote was blocked in the 
second ballot only after additional exhausting consultations and resignation 
of some power agents (so called “siloviki”).  
Thus, the State Duma in 1995 turned out to be much less polarized than 
in 1995; however, this lower polarization was not the result of positively 
oriented unanimity among deputies, but instead the byproduct of their con-
frontation with common enemy through the executive authorities. 
 
The State Duma of the 2nd convocation (1996–1999) 
According to the results of national elections held in December 1995, 
four parties cleared electoral threshold: CPRF, LDPR, “Our Home – Russia” 
and “Yabloko”. Communists and their allies controlled 220 mandates in the 
parliament; hence, the 2nd convocation of the State Duma turned out to be 
strongly influenced by the leftists opposed to the President and the Govern-
ment. Besides four factions formed by parties which passed to the State 
Duma, three deputy groups were created: “Agrarian Group”, “People’s 
Power” and “Regions of Russia”. 
We will consider 7 following deputy unions present in the State Duma of 
the 2nd convocation. 
– “Agrarian Group” (AG) 
– “Communist Party of the Russian Federation” (CPRF) 
– “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia” (LDPR) 
– “People’s Power” (PP) 
– “Our Home – Russia” (OHR) 
– “Regions of Russia” (RR) 
– “Yabloko” (YAB) 
Analogously to the case of the 1st convocation, the attempt was made to 
classify the independent deputies. 
– Independent (SPS)4 – the independent deputies characterized by 
democratic orientation (the majority of these deputies were elected to 
the State Duma of the 3rd convocation and formed the faction SPS), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 SPS – from Russian «СПС», Союз Правых Сил, the Union of Right Forces. 
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– Independent (KREM) – the independent deputies who were ready to 
cooperate “constructively” with Kremlin but distance themselves 
from it. 
 As in the State Duma of the 1st convocation, two dimensions were found 
to be enough to describe its political space (see [Aleskerov et al., 2007]). 
The latent factor corresponding to the variation of the X-coordinate of depu-
ties’ positions is, again, called “Loyalty – Opposition” towards authorities. 
At the same time, the Y-coordinate latent factor can be called “Liberals – 
Statesmen” (in the case of foreign affairs issues, “Westerners – Patriots”). In 
principle, latent factor suggested for the case of the 1st convocation (“Ideol-
ogy – Pragmatism”) may be used as well; nevertheless, some biases may 
arise because of the large number of the communist deputies. 
Fig. 10 represents the political map of the State Duma in 1996. We did 
not implement the “nearest neighborhood” technique for this case since the 
number of independent deputies who did not belong to any formal of infor-
mal group was relatively low. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1996 
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As Fig. 10–11 demonstrate, the State Duma of the 2nd convocation exhib-
ited more pluralism in deputies’ positions in 1996 than in 1995. While in 
1995 almost all deputy groups were located in the upper right quadrant of 
the political map, in 1996 loyal to the authorities “Our Home – Russia” and 
quite moderate “Regions of Russia” and “Yabloko” represented a sort of 
counterbalance to communists’ power in the State Duma. Nevertheless, 
CPRF and its allies were very numerous which led to the overall opposition 
spirit towards the President and the Government in the State Duma of the 2nd 
convocation.  
In 1996 “Yabloko” had much more liberal (ideology driven) position than 
in 1995 and was namely the only liberal faction in the State Duma in 1996; 
thus, variation along Y-coordinate was quite high. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that in contrast to the State Duma of the 1st convocation, the State Duma 
of the 2nd convocation demonstrated better discipline within deputy unions 
which is reflected in denser structure of clusters on the political map. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1996 
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Let us now present the values of the polarization index for the case of the 
State Duma in 1996 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.7251, 0.5329);  𝑃!"# = 0.4154,𝑃!"# = 0.3780,𝑃!!!" = 0.5334. 
 
The results obtain indicate two main features of the State Duma in 1996. 
Firstly, it became more polarized (polarization indices increased on average 
two times when calculated using different metrics) than in 1995. Secondly, 
on average deputy unions were slightly less opposed to the authorities and 
significantly more liberal and ideology driven comparing to the case of 
1995.5  
These two features of the State Duma in 1996 can be demonstrated by 
the following cases. The increased polarization may be supported by an ex-
ample of the Chairman of the State Duma election. The communist  
G. Seleznyov was elected to serve as Chairman of the State Duma, notwith-
standing “Yabloko” and their allies in the person of independent deputies 
persistently supported their candidacy, V. Lukin. Overall opposition nature 
of the Duma is demonstrated by the most notorious case during the 2nd con-
vocation, the denunciation of the Belavezha accords in March, 1996. At the 
same time, the fact that candidacy of V. Chernomyrdin for the post of 
Prime-Minister was approved by the State Duma supports the results indi-
cating some moderation in deputies’ positions and the fact that conflict in 
the parliament was not too hard. 
Let us now present how configuration of deputies changed in 1997 and 
show what are the consequences of these changes in terms of polarization as 
well as overall “Loyalty – Opposition” and “Liberals – Statesmen” orienta-
tion. 
As Fig. 12–13 indicate, the overall configuration of deputies’ positions 
on the political map in 1997 did not change dramatically comparing to the 
previous year. However, one can observe slight drift to the left of deputy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 It should be noted that interpretation of the 2nd latent factor as “Ideology – Pragmatism” 
is consistent with “Liberals – Statesmen” interpretation. Liberals tended to be more ideology 
driven than statesmen, while the latter, in their turn, exhibited more pragmatic willingness to 
cooperate with executives for the sake of the state interests. 
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unions “Regions of Russia” and “Yabloko” and Independent deputies which 
will afterwards form the faction SPS. This can be interpreted as the in-
creased loyalty of this unions towards the executive power. In addition, fac-
tion LDPR took more pragmatic, “Statesmen” position in the parliament in 
1997. 
 
Fig. 12. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1997 
 
Several changes in the Government took place in this year. Pro-
government candidacies of A. Chubais and B. Nemtsov were appointed for 
the Deputy Prime Ministers positions. However, several months later the 
State Duma demanded the President Yeltsin to give A. Chubais the sack.  
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In general, there was more tension inside the State Duma in 1997 than in 
previous years. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1997 
 
Polarization indices were calculated, and the results obtained are in good 
agreement with the actual state of affairs. 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 1997: 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.6430, 0.6181);  𝑃!"# = 0.4683,𝑃!"# = 0.3865,𝑃!!!" = 0.6298. 
 
In 1998 and 1999 the configuration of the parliament was almost the 
same. Fig. 14–17 demonstrate specific features of the State Duma in both 
1998 and 1999: the deputies’ positions highly varied along “Loyalty –  
Opposition” dimension while remained moderate and almost constant along 
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“Liberal – Statesmen” dimension with the exception of liberal “Yabloko”  
and “Statesmen” LDPR. 
 
Fig. 14. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1998 
 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 1998: 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.7121, 0.5378);  𝑃!"# = 0.3563,𝑃!"# = 0.2920,𝑃!!!" = 0.4821. 
 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 1999: 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.6922, 0.6160);  𝑃!"# = 0.3442,𝑃!"# = 0.2913,𝑃!!!" = 0.4602. 
	  
	  
32	  
 
 
Fig. 15. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1998 
 
As there was virtually no difference between configurations of deputies’ 
positions in the State Duma in 1998 and 1999, the center of mass which 
characterize the overall nature of the parliament and the values of polariza-
tion index had hardly changed.  
On average, the parliament in 1998 and 1999 revealed increased opposi-
tion to the current authorities and continued to take moderate position along 
“Liberals – Statesmen” dimension. At the same time, polarization in the 
State Duma decreased comparing to the beginning of the convocation.  
In 1998 and 1999 the confrontation between the parliament, on the one 
hand, and the President and the Government, on the other hand, increased. 
New personnel changes in the Government in 1998 (started with resignation 
of V. Chernomyrdin) led to the escalation of the conflict, the crisis in the 
Government and, finally, after the economic crisis in the country, to the res-
ignation of the Government. In addition, the State Duma initiated the im-
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peachment process in 1998 and only new appointment of the Prime Minister 
did not allow the parliament to muster a constitutional majority of 300 votes 
in 1999 on the eve of the final voting on the impeachment issue.  
 
Fig. 16. Spatial model of the State Duma in 1999 
 
After the hostiles in Dagestan broke out, the President Yeltsin dismissed 
the recently formed Government and appointed V. Putin for the post of he 
Prime Minister simultaneously claiming that Mr. Putin is nominated as his 
successor. 
The decreased values of polarization in the State Duma in 1998 and 1999 
is a reflection of increased unity of the deputies in their struggle against ex-
ecutive power (as it was in 1995, at the end of the 1st convocation). It is 
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noteworthy, that at the beginning of the convocations the parliament is more 
polarized which may be treated as a residual effects of tense elections races; 
however, with the approach of the end of the convocation, the parliament 
reveals less polarization and increasing opposition towards the President and 
the Government. 
 
Fig. 17. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 1999 
 
The State Duma of the 3rd convocation (2000–2003) 
According to the results of the legislative elections held in December, 
1999, configuration of forces in the State Duma substantially changed. Re-
cently formed party “Unity” rapidly gained popularity and represented a real 
counterbalance to the opposition leftists through CPRF in the new convoca-
tion.  
Deputies in the State Duma of the 3rd convocation formed 9 faction and 
deputy groups: 
– “Agrarian Group” (AG) 
– “Unity”  
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– “Communist Party of the Russian Federation” (CPRF) 
–  “Liberal Democratic Party of Russia” (LDPR) 
– “People’s deputy” (MP) 
– “Fatherland – all Russia” (FAR)  
–  “Regions of Russia” (RR) 
– “Unity of Right Forces” (SPS) 
– “Yabloko” (YAB) 
For the State Duma of the 3rd convocation the independent deputies who 
were not affiliated to any faction or deputy group were considered as the 
whole entity. The independent deputies whose position was close enough to 
a particular deputy union were affiliated to this union. 
The most numerous factions, opposition CPRF and pro-government 
“Unity” created two main poles in the newly elected parliament during the 
first half of its term. However, they both had almost the same moderate posi-
tions along “Liberals – Statesmen” dimension. The positions of the next 
biggest deputy unions, “People’s deputy” and “Fatherland – all Russia” were 
exactly at the center of the unite square during the first half of the 3rd convo-
cation. Fig. 18–21 present configurations of deputies’ positions in 2000 and 
2001 which were very similar.  
As will be demonstrated below, the centers of mass in 2000 and 2001 
turned out to be virtually at the same point, and values of polarization index 
were almost the same which is in accordance with the fact that political 
maps in 2000 and 2001 look very similar. Let us first present the exact re-
sults for both 2000 and 2001 years and then provide a sound interpretation 
for them. 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 2000 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.4948, 0.5469);  𝑃!"# = 0.3722,𝑃!"# = 0.3175,𝑃!!!" = 0.4949. 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 2001 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.5110, 0.5890); 𝑃!"# = 0.3857,𝑃!"# = 0.3191,𝑃!!!" = 0.5218. 
As the results demonstrate, during the first half of the 3rd convocation, 
the State Duma was on average much less opposed to the executive power 
than ever before. At the same time, deputies in general continued to take 
moderate positions along “Liberals – Statesmen” dimension.  
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Fig. 18. Spatial model of the State Duma in 2000 
 
For the first time the State Duma had really strong counterbalance to the 
communists; nevertheless, the forces of “Unity” and liberal deputy unions 
were not enough to form a stable majority loyal to the executive authorities. 
While during the second half of both the 1st and the 2nd convocation the ten-
sion between the legislative and the executive power led to less polarization 
in the former, with the emergence of strong force loyal to the executives, the 
confrontation moved inside the parliament. Hence, the parliament on aver-
age became less opposed to the executives and more polarized.  
The term of the State Duma of the 3rd convocation began with the con-
flict motivated by portfolio allocation, and during its first half the outcome 
of voting depended on how flexible the positions of “Unity” and their more 
moderate colleagues were. For instance, the law on the Federal budget was 
approved by “Unity”, “Yabloko” and SPS without support of the leftists.  
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At the same time, the constitutional laws on the state symbolics were adopt-
ed by “Unity”, CPRF, “Fatherland – all Russia” without support of “Ya-
bloko” and SPS which voted against these laws. However, the attempt of 
“Unity” to compromise with CPRF and their allies did not resolve the con-
flict and failed to ensure more loyalty from the part of the latter.  For exam-
ple, the law on political parties met heavy resistance from the leftists; more-
over, they even initiated the discussion of the question of non-confidence in 
the Government.  
 
Fig 19. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 2000 
 
The remaining resistance of opposition CPRF and allies notwithstanding, 
majority loyal to the executives was destined to be formed. In April, 2000 the 
beginning of merge of “Unity” and “Fatherland – all Russia” and the creation 
of the unit party on their basis was announced. Moreover, it was also declared 
that the coalition based on the four centrist deputy unions will be formed. The 
process aimed at limiting resources of the opposition was launched. 
This process and further shift to more loyalty in the parliament was re-
flected in the configuration of political forces in 2002 and 2003. Fig. 22–25 
demonstrate the main changes in political positions of the deputies. 
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Fig. 20. Spatial model of the State Duma in 2001 
 
The consequences of the process of merging of deputy unions “Unity” 
and “Fatherland – all Russia” reflected in political maps of the State Duma 
in 2002 and 2003. Positions of deputies affiliated to these unions are virtu-
ally the same and extremely loyal to the executive power. Positions of oth-
er deputy unions except “Yabloko” shifted to the left revealing more loyal-
ty to the current executives comparing to the first half of the 3rd convoca-
tion. Thus, two poles represented by “Unity” and allies, on the one hand, 
and CPRF and allies, on the other hand, became more strongly pro-
nounced. These tendencies reflected in the values of polarization index 
provided below. 
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Fig. 21. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 2001 
 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 2002 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.4564, 0.6124); 𝑃!"# = 0.4805,𝑃!"# = 0.3818,𝑃!!!" = 0.6561. 
 
Polarization index values obtained for the case of 2003 
 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑎𝑠𝑠 = (0.4530, 0.5169); 𝑃!"# = 0.4796,𝑃!"# = 0.3797,𝑃!!!" = 0.6654. 
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Fig. 22. Spatial model of the State Duma in 2002 
 
The coordinates of centers of mass in 2002 and 2003 were very close. 
They support the fact that during these years the State Duma on the whole 
exhibited more loyal voting patterns than ever before.  
In December, 2002 parliamentary majority was formalized after the in-
augural congress of the party “United Russia” formed on the basis of “Uni-
ty” and “Fatherland – all Russia”. Since then the process of adoption of laws 
had been accelerated. Resources of the opposition deputy unions became 
even more limited after the laws on political extremism and holding of a 
referendum were adopted and some personnel changed in committees were 
carried out. In 2003 there even was a trend in the parliament according to 
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which only those laws were approved which were supported by recently 
created loyal majority, whereas position of other factions and deputy groups 
was ignored. In such a way electricity, housing and communal services, and 
local government reforms were approved.  
 
 
Fig. 23. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 2002 
 
At the same time, during the second half of the term the State Duma of 
the 3rd convocation was the most polarized Russian parliament throughout 
the period under consideration. Indeed, the existence of two roughly equally 
sized poles located at extremely opposed coordinates along “Loyalty – Op-
position” dimension which attracted numerous groups with moderate posi-
tion on the political map consistently led to the significantly high polariza-
tion in the State Duma. Opposition factions persistently defended their posi-
tion and this caused tension inside the parliament.  
Below, the summary tables and graphs are provided in order to simplify 
the comparison. 
As Table 3.1 and Fig. 25 show, three versions of the 𝑃 index exhibit the 
same trend in polarization in the State Duma. The values of 𝑃 index with 
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Chebychev function as a metric are the highest, while values of 𝑃 index with 
Manhattan distance are the lowest.  
 
 
Fig. 24. Spatial model of the State Duma in 2003 
 
During the whole period under consideration polarization in the Russian 
parliament was mostly associated with disagreement of deputies in relation 
to their loyalty to the current executive authorities. In general, the higher 
opposition of the whole parliament towards the executives was associated 
with less polarization, whereas when conflict moved inside the State Duma, 
and pro-governmental forces were stronger, polarization in the parliament 
increased. 
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Fig. 25. Positions of the deputy unions in the State Duma in 2003 
 
The Russian parliament was the least polarized in 1995 and the most polar-
ized in 2003. Decreased polarization in 1995 matches the onset of the gov-
ernmental crisis and increased unanimity of deputies in their opposition to-
wards the President and the Government. At the same time, in 1996, when the 
new convocation of the State Duma was elected, polarization in the parliament 
increased indicating higher pluralism in opinions and the emergence of pro-
governmental unions. However, since 1999 polarization in the parliament 
have been only increasing. During the 3rd convocation the forces in the State 
Duma started to concentrate around two opposed poles represented by pro-
governmental “Unity” and opposition CPRF. Even though by the end of the 
term the State Duma of the 3rd convocation de facto was under control of ma-
jority loyal to the executives, the opposition factions were persistent enough in 
their position which led to relatively high polarization in the parliament. 
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Table 1. Polarization in the State Duma of the 1st – 3rd convocations (groups-
points framework) 
 
Year Center of mass 𝑷𝑬𝒖𝒄 𝑷𝑴𝒂𝒏 𝑷𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒃 
1994 (0.6746, 0.5523) 0.3479 0.3136 0.4487 
1995 (0.7668, 0.7231) 0.2190 0.1876 0.2919 
1996 (0.7251, 0.5329) 0.4154 0.3780 0.5334 
1997 (0.6430, 0.6181) 0.4683 0.3865 0.6298 
1998 (0.7121, 0.5378) 0.3563 0.2920 0.4821 
1999 (0.6922, 0.6160) 0.3442 0.2913 0.4602 
2000 (0.4948, 0.5469) 0.3722 0.3175 0.4949 
2001 (0.5110, 0.5890) 0.3857 0.3191 0.5218 
2002 (0.4564, 0.6124) 0.4805 0.3818 0.6561 
2003 (0.4530, 0.5169) 0.4796 0.3797 0.6654. 
 
 
 
Fig. 26. Polarization in the Russian State Duma 1994–2003 (polarization 
indices estimated within groups-points framework) 
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Разработан многомерный индекс поляризованности на основе индекса Алескерова – Голу-
бенко. Представлено несколько версий индекса поляризованности в зависимости от разных 
функций расстояния. Рассмотрены основные свойства индекса. Численно изучено поведение 
индекса поляризованности в случае «равномерного» распределения групп в единичном квадра-
те и единичном трехмерном кубе.
Исследована поляризованность в Государственной думе Российской Федерации (1994–
2003 гг.) с помощью построенного индекса. При анализе использована ранее разработанная на 
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ственная Дума, и наоборот.
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